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ABSTRACT
Objectives The first objective is to estimate the joint 
impact of social care, public health and healthcare 
expenditure on mortality in England. The second objective 
is to use these results to estimate the impact of spending 
constraints in 2010/2011–2014/2015 on total mortality.
Methods The impact of social care, healthcare and public 
health expenditure on mortality is analysed by applying the 
two- stage least squares method to local authority data for 
2013/2014. Next, we compare the growth in healthcare 
and social care expenditure pre-2010 and post-2010. We 
use the difference between these growth rates and the 
responsiveness of mortality to changes in expenditure 
taken from the 2013/2014 cross- sectional analysis to 
estimate the additional mortality generated by post-2010 
spending constraints.
Results Our most conservative results suggest that 
(1) a 1% increase in healthcare expenditure reduces 
mortality by 0.532%; (2) a 1% increase in social care 
expenditure reduces mortality by 0.336%; and (3) a 1% 
increase in local public health spending reduces mortality 
by 0.019%. Using the first two of these elasticities 
and data on the change in spending growth between 
2001/2002–2009/2010 and 2010/2011–2014/2015, we 
find that there were 57 550 (CI 3075 to 111 955) more 
deaths in the latter period than would have been observed 
had spending growth during this period matched that in 
2001/2002–2009/2010.
Conclusions All three forms of public healthcare- related 
expenditure save lives and there is evidence that additional 
social care expenditure is more than twice as productive 
as additional healthcare expenditure. Our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the slowdown in the 
rate of improvement in life expectancy in England and 
Wales since 2010 is attributable to spending constraints in 
the healthcare and social care sectors.
INTRODUCTION
The rate of improvement in life expectancy 
in England and Wales has slowed markedly 
since 2010.1–3 This decline has been most 
marked for women aged over 85 years and 
these people tend to be the most physi-
cally frail and/or disadvantaged.4 It has also 
been noted that the very elderly tend to be 
the most dependent on a well- functioning 
publicly funded health and social care 
system.5 As the slowdown in life expectancy 
growth has coincided with the imposition of 
government spending constraints, it has been 
hypothesised that these constraints are the 
major cause of the stalled improvement in life 
expectancy.6 7
A recent study assembled annual data 
on healthcare and social care spending for 
England from 2001 to 2014 to estimate the 
impact of the UK government’s spending 
constraints on mortality.8 Time trend analysis 
was used to compare the actual mortality rate 
between 2011 and 2014 with the expected 
counterfactual rate based on the trend 
before the imposition of budgetary restric-
tions in 2010. The study found that spending 
constraints between 2010 and 2014 were asso-
ciated with an estimated 45 000 more deaths 
than would have been expected based on 
pre-2010 trends.8
This finding has generated considerable 
controversy and merits further investigation. 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► Cross- sectional analysis of the causal impact of so-
cial care, healthcare and public health expenditure 
on mortality.
 ► Two- stage least squares regression allows for the 
endogenous nature of all three types of expenditure.
 ► Controls for the need for healthcare- related expen-
diture are also included.
 ► We compare the growth in healthcare and social 
care expenditure pre-2010 and post-2010. We find 
that there were 57 550 more deaths in the latter pe-
riod than would have been observed had spending 
growth during this period matched that in the earlier 
period.
 ► The responsiveness of mortality to changes in 
health- related expenditure in 2013/2014 may not 
hold in other years and there may be other factors 
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We approach the same issue but from a very different 
perspective. Instead of extrapolating historic trends at the 
national level, we use two- stage least squares (instrumental 
variable) regression to estimate the causal relationship 
between spending and mortality across local authorities 
(LAs) at a single point in time (2013/2014). Like the 
time trend study, we consider the impact of both health-
care and social care expenditure on mortality, but we also 
control for the impact of public health expenditure.
There are few English studies of the impact of 
healthcare on mortality, and even fewer of the joint 
impact of healthcare and public health expenditure on 
mortality.9 10 The social care literature has concentrated 
on the impact of expenditure on the quality of life rather 
than on mortality.11 Other studies focus on the rela-
tionship between the public social care and healthcare 
sectors. They find a substitution effect between social care 
and healthcare services so that an increase in social care 
services may improve hospital outcomes, for example, 
by reducing delayed discharges.12–15 However, we are 
not aware of any English studies of the joint impact of 
social care, healthcare and public health expenditure 
on mortality, and hence this study presents the first such 
estimates. We combine these estimates with information 
about the size of the post-2010 spending constraints to 
provide an alternative estimate of how many lives such 
constraints cost between 2011 and 2014.
A recent American study looked at the association 
between healthcare/social service expenditure and 
health outcomes across the states for the period 2000–
2009.16 This concluded that debates about how much 
should be invested in healthcare should also consider how 
much is invested in social services. We build on this work 
in two ways so that we are able to provide more precise 
guidance for English policy makers. First, the American 
study defined social service expenditure as comprising 
public expenditure on all services (such as education, 
transportation and public safety) that address the social 
determinants of health. Instead, we focus on definitions 
of healthcare and adult social care expenditure as they 
reflect the different budgets allocated by central govern-
ment to different public bodies in England. Second, 
by adopting this approach we are also able to estimate 
the size of the causal impact of this and other types of 
healthcare- related expenditure on mortality rather than 
examining observed associations. Such causal estimates 
can start to inform a range of decisions about the scale 
and allocation of public expenditure made by public 
bodies and central government.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The second section 
describes the institutional arrangements associated with 
the three types of health- related expenditure that are the 
focus of this study. The third section describes the health 
outcome equation to be estimated and how we address 
the issue of reverse causation (ie, that mortality may affect 
expenditure as well as vice versa). The fourth section 
describes our estimation approach and the fifth section 
presents brief details of the dataset. The sixth section 
presents our results and there is a discussion of them in 
the last section.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HEALTH-RELATED 
EXPENDITURE IN ENGLAND IN 2013/2014
Social care
Adults with a physical disability, a learning disability, or 
a physical or mental illness often have difficulty with 
routine daily activities such as washing, dressing, cooking 
and shopping. Such individuals are usually supported in 
two main ways: either formally through services that they 
or their LA pay for; and/or informally by family, friends 
or neighbours.17 In England, social care expenditure 
funds residential and nursing home placements, social 
care in the community to aid daily living, short- term care 
(eg, vision rehabilitation and other reablement services 
to improve independence), equipment and domestic 
adaptations, and information provision. Public spending 
on other services addressing the social determinants of 
health (such as housing, income support, sanitation, 
transport, etc) is not included in our measure of social 
care expenditure.
Funding for LAs comes from three major sources: the 
local council tax, central government grants and local 
business rates. The size of the central government grant 
will reflect the LA’s relative need for expenditure and its 
income raising capability. LAs have extensive statutory 
responsibilities in the area of adult social care and they 
apply national criteria to assess whether people’s needs 
are eligible for LA- funded social care. These national 
criteria were introduced by the Care Act (2014), and 
reduced the variation in the eligibility for LA- funded 
social care between local areas. Before the introduction 
of the Care Act, LAs were able to set their own thresholds 
for the need for social care based on the criteria set out 
in the Fair Access to Care Services framework.18 Even if 
eligible for LA- funded social care, the provision of such 
funding is means tested so that, depending on a person’s 
financial situation, they may be asked to contribute to 
some or all of their social care costs.17
Care needs are often multiple and interrelated with 
other needs. Adult social care is therefore part of a 
complex system of related public services and forms of 
support. Since 2010, spending constraints imposed by 
central government may have had some unfortunate 
effects on allied public services. For example, there is 
the long- standing argument that inadequate social care 
provision may be responsible for the delayed discharge of 
elderly patients from hospital, and that inadequate care 
in the community may contribute to the growth in emer-
gency hospital admissions.19 20 Moreover, inadequate 
social care provision may be associated with an increase 
in mortality. Although social care is primarily concerned 
with improving the quality of life, it is perfectly plausible 
that social care extends life and that those with care needs 
enjoy both a lower mortality rate and a better quality of 
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Public health
Consideration of social care expenditure in isolation is 
slightly problematic because, since April 2013, LAs have 
also been responsible for local public health services. 
Each ‘unitary’ or upper tier LA receives a fixed annual 
budget, ring- fenced for public health activities.21 For a 
few services there may be scope to use either the social 
care or the public health budget and so, when studying 
the impact of social care expenditure, it may be wise to 
control for expenditure on local public health services. 
And of course, public health expenditure will have a 
direct effect on mortality. Local public health activi-
ties accounted for over £2500 million of expenditure in 
2013/2014 and included services related to substance 
misuse (roughly one- quarter of expenditure), sexual 
health (roughly one- third of expenditure), children’s 
health (about 10%) and tobacco control (about 5%). 
Expenditure on national public health programmes is 
excluded from the analysis because no breakdown of this 
expenditure by locality is available.22
Healthcare in England
English National Health Service (NHS) healthcare 
expenditure was managed by 212 Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) in 2013/2014.23 These local health 
authorities were each allocated a fixed annual budget 
and this was determined centrally in a similar manner 
to how each LA was assigned its budget for local public 
health responsibilities. These budgets were used by CCGs 
to fund expenditure on various types of care including 
inpatient, outpatient and community care, and pharma-
ceutical prescriptions. It is worth noting that CCGs did 
not have responsibility for either primary care or special-
ised commissioning in the study year (2013/2014). These 
were administered centrally and expenditure on these 
items has been excluded from the study because data are 
not available by local area.
METHODS: THE ESTIMATING EQUATION AND THE SELECTION OF 
INSTRUMENTS FOR EXPENDITURE
The estimated health outcome equation
We adapt the usual health outcome equation to esti-
mate the joint impact of social care, public health and 




morality ratei = f[healthcare expenditurei, public health expenditurei,
social care expenditurei] + controls for needi + ei  
 (1)
The control variables reflect the need for health- related 
expenditure in authority i, and e reflects everything not 
included elsewhere in the specification.9 Quantifying the 
impact of these categories of expenditure on mortality is 
challenging for two reasons: first, there might be some 
reverse causation with historical outcomes (eg, mortality) 
influencing the current level of budget/expenditure; and 
second, there might be some unobserved factor that is 
driving both expenditure and mortality.
As an illustration of the reverse causation issue, consider 
figure 1. The box defines the structural model in which 
the mortality rate depends on social care expenditure 
and controls for need (we have omitted healthcare and 
public health expenditure from the figure for simplicity 
but the same illustration could also be used for these two 
other types of health- related expenditure). In figure 1A, 
social care expenditure both affects mortality and is 
affected by (historical) mortality. This reverse causation 
links expenditure and the error term, and this makes the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator both biased and 
inconsistent.
The solution to this problem is to find variables (known 
as ‘instruments’) that are good predictors of expenditure 
but which have no direct impact on mortality and are 
unaffected by unobserved factors. These instruments lie 
outside the box in figure 1B because they do not belong 
in the structural model. They are used in a regression 
model to predict the level of expenditure that is not 
influenced by either historical mortality or unobserved 
factors (this is the first stage of the two- stage least squares 
approach). Having severed the link with unobserved 
factors and mortality, the predicted level of expenditure 
is then used in another regression model to examine the 
causal impact of (predicted) expenditure on mortality 
(this is the second stage of the two- stage least squares 
approach (2SLS)).
A recent study of the impact of healthcare expen-
diture suggested using components of the formulae 
used to distribute funding across health authorities as 
Figure 1 Illustration of the reverse causation issue and its 

















































































































4 Martin S, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e046417. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-046417
Open access 
instruments for healthcare expenditure.24 We apply this 
approach to identification here because the distribution 
of funding for all three types of health- related expendi-
ture is informed by various centrally determined resource 
allocation formulae.
Instruments for social care expenditure
In the study year (2013/2014), each LA received a grant 
from central government that reflected its relative need 
for expenditure on a variety of services for which it was 
responsible. Each service area had its own relative needs 
formula (RNF) that contributed to its overall relative 
need, but LAs were free to decide how much to spend in 
each service area (subject to meeting their statutory obli-
gations). Adult social care had two RNFs: one for people 
aged 18–64, and another for those aged over 65. The RNF 
for the older people’s social care included a basic amount 
per client with top- ups for age, deprivation, low income, 
low population density (because this increases service 
delivery costs) and local input prices (in some areas, such 
as London, labour costs will be higher than elsewhere).25 
As any instrument should be well correlated with expen-
diture but not directly correlated with mortality, we use 
the sparsity and input price adjustment variables from 
the older person’s RNF as instruments for (predictors of) 
social care expenditure.
A study of the impact of LA expenditure on home care 
services approached the instrument issue from a different 
perspective.26 It claimed that social care expenditure will 
reflect the service eligibility policy employed by different 
LAs and that ‘the innate culture and perspective of the 
council…will drive the generosity of policies more than 
small differences in the health of the population’. The 
researchers proposed the use of a set of four dummy 
variables reflecting the type of LA (Shire, Unitary, Metro-
politan, London) as instruments on the assumption that 
‘similar’ LAs will have ‘similar’ eligibility policies and 
expenditure levels.26
Finally, we note that LA- funded social care is means 
tested and, for example, owner occupiers who go into care 
homes are expected to sell their home to fund their care 
but that those in rented accommodation have their care 
costs paid for by the LA. This suggests that the propor-
tion of households that are owner occupied in an area 
may serve as an instrument for LA social care expenditure 
(given appropriate controls for health- related need).
Together, the funding rule, the type of LA and the 
owner- occupied household variables provide seven poten-
tial instruments for social care expenditure.
Instruments for healthcare expenditure
For our study year (2013/2014), each local health 
authority (212 CCGs) was assigned a fixed share of the 
national budget (£65 billion) by the Department of 
Health within which they were supposed to meet expen-
diture on most types of healthcare except primary care, 
specialised commissioning and public health. With a little 
simplification, the budget available to each CCG can be 
expressed as
 
local CCG budget per person = (national budget per person)×
(local age index)×
(local additional needs index)×
(local input price index)×
(local DFT Index)  
(2)
where (1) the age index reflects the demographic 
profile of the local population; (2) the additional needs 
index reflects local deprivation and other factors likely to 
influence the need for healthcare and includes a measure 
of historical mortality; (3) the input price index (the 
market forces factor (MFF)) reflects prices in the local 
health economy; and (4) the distance from target (DFT) 
index reflects how far each health authority’s actual 
budget allocation is from its target allocation.24
Because the additional needs index contains historical 
mortality, it is clear that reverse causality is an issue and 
that this (additional needs) index cannot constitute a 
plausible instrument for expenditure. However, the other 
indices provide suitable instruments for CCG expen-
diture. Further details about these instruments are in 
online supplemental appendix A1 but, in summary, these 
funding rule variables are as follows: (1) the DFT index 
for the total allocation; (2) the MFF for the Hospital and 
Community Health Services (HCHS) component of the 
total allocation; and (3) the age index from the cost of 
prescribing pharmaceuticals component of the total 
allocation.
Instruments for public health expenditure
We instrument the public health expenditure variable 
using a similar approach to both healthcare and social 
care expenditure. The resource allocation formula for 
the public health grant to LAs has a similar structure to 
the CCG grant (as outlined in equation (2)) and we use 
two of the four local adjustment factors for the public 
health grant (the MFF and the DFT) as instruments for 
public health expenditure. Further details about these 
instruments are in online supplemental appendix A2.
Are the selected instruments plausible and strong?
For 2SLS to generate consistent estimates of the impact 
of expenditure on mortality, certain assumptions have 
to be met. First, the instruments should be good predic-
tors of the expenditure variable. The usual test for good 
(‘strong’) instruments is that the F statistic associated with 
the instrument(s) in the first- stage regression should be 
about 10 or better, and hence, we report the Sanderson- 
Windmeijer F test statistic for all first- stage estimations.27 
The second assumption is that any instrument for expen-
diture has no direct effect on mortality other than via its 
effect on expenditure, and that the instrument should be 
uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of expendi-
ture and mortality (this is the validity assumption).
Studies that use instrumental variable regression 
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believe that such instruments are likely to be valid. This 
discussion for the present study can be found in online 
supplemental appendix A3. In addition, the instrument 
validity assumption can be tested empirically and hence, 
where possible, we report the Hansen- Sargan test statistic 
of instrument validity for the second- stage equations.28
METHODS: ESTIMATION APPROACH
The estimation of equation (1) is complicated by the 
fact that theory provides little guidance as to the identity 
of the appropriate controls for need. Hence, following 
previous studies, we identify a dozen socioeconomic 
variable—such as the proportion of the population 
of working age employed in managerial/professional 
occupations—as potential controls for the need for 
healthcare/public health/social care expenditure.9 10
We also have a dozen instruments. There are four 
‘type of LA’ dummy variables, two variables from the 
RNF for social care, and a measure of the local owner- 
occupation rate for social care expenditure. We also 
have two potential instruments for public health expen-
diture (the DFT index and the input price index) from 
its resource allocation formula. Finally, we have three 
potential instruments (the DFT index, the input price 
index and the age index) for healthcare expenditure 
from the resource allocation formula for healthcare 
budgets.
Ideally, we would like a more parsimonious set of 
controls (to reduce multicollinearity problems) and 
a more parsimonious set of instruments (to minimise 
problems with weak instruments). To achieve these 
goals, we first estimate a health outcome equation using 
OLS with all controls and all three types of expenditure 
included. The least significant control is removed from 
the specification and the equation is re- estimated. This 
process—of dropping the least significant regressor and 
re- estimating—continues until there are only signifi-
cant controls remaining (the expenditure variables are 
forced to be ever- present). Having identified potentially 
relevant covariates, these controls are then included 
in a two- stage least squares specification and a process 
similar to backward selection is used to eliminate prob-
lematic (invalid and/or weak) instruments.
As a sensitivity analysis, we repeat the above analysis but 
use forward rather than backward selection to identify a 
parsimonious set of controls.
When estimating regressions, the values for all vari-
ables are logged so that regression coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities (eg, the coefficient on an 
expenditure variable reflects the impact on mortality 
of a 1% change in the value of the expenditure vari-
able). All observations are weighted by the size of LA’s 
population. Estimation is undertaken using the Stata 
ivreg2 program.28 In addition to the weak instrument 
and instrument validity tests mentioned above, we also 
report a test for whether the expenditure variables are 
endogenous and a reset test (Pesaran- Taylor) for model 
mis- specification.29
Patient and public involvement
Neither patients nor the public were involved in the 
design, or conduct, or reporting or dissemination of our 
research.
DATA
We use the gross current expenditure on adult social 
services by each LA in 2013/2014 as our measure of 
social service expenditure.22 This measure excludes 
capital charges and, to avoid any double counting 
issues, it also excludes income from joint commis-
sioning arrangements and income from the NHS. 
However, it includes income from locally determined 
(and means tested) client contributions towards their 
LA care package. This expenditure figure is divided by 
the LA population size to generate a per capita expen-
diture figure. As table 1 shows, the average spend by LA 
is £307 per person, although there is considerable vari-
ation in expenditure across the country: for example, 
social service expenditure ranges from £209 per person 
in Barnsley to £404 in Camden and £660 in the City of 
London.
Healthcare expenditure data are available from 
each CCG’s programme budgeting return.30 These are 
converted to an LA basis using a mapping that trans-
lates population levels in mid-2012 from (parts of) 
CCGs to LAs. The average LA healthcare spend was 
£1152 per person in 2013/2014. Public health expen-
diture data are available from the LA revenue expen-
diture and financing document for 2013/2014.22 The 
average public health spend for this year was £53 per 
person. Total healthcare expenditure (£65 billion) is 
about four times the size of social service expenditure 
(£17 billion), and the latter is six times the size of public 
health expenditure (£2.5 billion).
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables employed 
in the study are in table 1. The mortality indicator is the 
years of life lost per 100 000 people for deaths under 
age 75. The mean rate across all LAs is 443 years but this 
varies considerably, ranging from 268 years (in the City 
of London) to 776 years (in Blackpool). There is also 
considerable variation in the socioeconomic control 
variables (largely constructed using population census 
data for 2011). For example, on average, 84% of the 
population is in the white ethnic group but the average 
masks considerable variation, from 29% in Newham 
(London) to almost 99% in Cumbria, in Redcar and 
Cleveland, and in the Isles of Scilly.
Finally, descriptive statistics for the instruments for 
each type of expenditure are at the bottom of table 1. 
Some reveal considerable variation around the country 
(eg, the input price index for older people’s social 
services) but others do not (eg, the impact of popula-





















































































































We begin by estimating an OLS specification that 
includes all 14 controls for the need for health- related 
expenditure. Of the 14 controls, only 5 are significant 
at the 5% level and this result is in column 1 of table 2. 
Application of the backward selection process described 
above reveals a more parsimonious set of controls 
(column 2). If these are included in an IV specification 
with all 12 potential instruments, we obtain the result 
shown in column 3. The statistical tests reported at the 
foot of table 2 suggest that the instrument set associated 
with the column 3 result is both invalid (the Hansen- 
Sargan test statistic is significant) and weak (only one 
of the Sanderson- Windmeijer test statistics (for public 
health expenditure) is about 10 or better). The three 
first- stage equations used to predict healthcare, social 
care and public health expenditure are in columns 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables employed in study (created by the authors)
Variable description Obs Mean SD Min Max
Mortality rate, population and expenditure variables
  Years of life lost rate, standardised, per 100 000 population, 
2013/2014/2015 pooled
151 443.3 85 267.5 775.9
  Local authority population, 2013/2014 151 369 361 271 897 2381 1 481 378
  Social service spend per person, 2013/2014, £ 151 306.6 46.58 209.08 660.42
  NHS healthcare spend per person, 2013/2014, £ 151 1152.13 75.81 1019.89 1479.11
  Public health expenditure per person, 2013/2014, £ 152 52.6 25.15 18.52 182.21
Controls
  Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 152 23.0753 8.604 5.4466 43.4465
  Young adult social service need per person 151 1.0000 0.2519 0.4341 1.7546
  Older adult social service need per person 151 1.0000 0.2329 0.5714 1.9716
  Proportion of all residents born outside the European Union 152 0.1281 0.1147 0.0144 0.5060
  Proportion of population in white ethnic group 152 0.8364 0.1626 0.2897 0.9882
  Proportion of population providing unpaid care 152 0.1008 0.0138 0.0651 0.1289
  Proportion of population aged 16–74 with no qualifications 152 0.2469 0.0606 0.0720 0.3874
  Proportion of households without a car 152 0.2862 0.1248 0.0899 0.6940
  Proportion of households that are one pensioner households, 2011 152 0.1206 0.0208 0.0596 0.1667
  Proportion of households that are lone parent households with 
dependent children
152 0.0745 0.0185 0.70208 0.1436
  Proportion of population aged 16–74 that are permanently sick 152 0.0424 0.0149 0.0086 0.0879
  Proportion of those aged 16–74 that are long- term unemployed 152 0.0183 0.0058 0.0043 0.0367
  Proportion of those aged 16–74 in employment that are working 
agriculture
152 0.0064 0.0099 0.0003 0.0572
  Proportion of those aged 16–74 in managerial and professional 
occupations
152 0.3114 0.0769 0.1835 0.6674
Instruments: for social service (GSS) expenditure
  Type of LA: county council 152 0.1776 0.3835 0.0000 1.0000
  Type of LA: London borough 152 0.2171 0.4136 0.0000 1.0000
  Type of LA: metropolitan district 152 0.2368 0.4266 0.0000 1.0000
  Type of LA: unitary authority 152 0.3684 0.4840 0.0000 1.0000
  Input price index for older people’s social services 152 1.0426 0.0634 1.0000 1.3607
  Population sparsity measure 151 1.0057 0.0079 1.0000 1.0345
  Proportion of households that are owner occupied 152 0.6190 0.1152 0.2611 0.8086
Instruments: for public health (PH) expenditure
  Distance from target index, public health expenditure, 2013/2014 152 1.0667 0.5362 0.5362 6.6247
  Input price index (MFF), public health expenditure, 2013/2014 152 1.0122 0.0790 0.9151 1.2076
Instruments: for NHS healthcare (PB) expenditure
  Distance from target index, NHS healthcare expenditure 152 1.0055 0.0515 0.9282 1.2250
  Input price index (MFF), resource allocation HCHS formula 152 1.0063 0.0643 0.9319 1.1416
  Age index, resource allocation prescribing formula 152 0.9776 0.1283 0.6422 1.3007





































































































































































Table 2 Obtaining a preferred health outcome specification for social care, healthcare and public health expenditure, backward selection (second- stage results) (created 
by the authors)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)








































Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted






specification Parsimonious_v2 Parsimonious_v3 Parsimonious_v4 Parsimonious_v5
























































Young adult social service need per person 0.096
(0.166)
Older adult social service need per person 0.080
(0.073)
% residents born outside the European Union −0.038*
(0.020)




























% population aged 16–74 with no qualifications −0.043
(0.101)
% households without a car −0.201***
(0.074)
% households that are one pensioner households 0.057
(0.073)
% lone parent households with dependent children 0.025
(0.065)






































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)








































Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted






specification Parsimonious_v2 Parsimonious_v3 Parsimonious_v4 Parsimonious_v5
% aged 16–74 that are long- term unemployed 0.057
(0.057)
% aged 16–74 in employment working agriculture −0.013
(0.012)


































Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
R- squared 0.919 0.908
Ramsey reset F- statistic 5.096 6.448
Probability >F 0.002 0.000
Endogeneity test statistic 8.934 15.536 15.510 23.482 18.528
Endogeneity p value 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Hansen- Sargan test statistic 21.671 10.327 2.506 0.265 0.257
Hansen- Sargan p value 0.006 0.066 0.286 0.876 0.612
Pesaran- Taylor reset statistic 0.187 2.892 3.540 0.008 0.285
Pesaran- Taylor p value 0.665 0.089 0.060 0.927 0.593
Sanderson- Windmeijer_PB F- statistic 8.390 8.966 13.333 14.352 15.818
Sanderson- Windmeijer _PB p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sanderson- Windmeijer _GSS F- statistic 4.437 4.875 6.720 9.063 11.567
Sanderson- Windmeijer _GSS p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sanderson- Windmeijer _PH F- statistic 28.259 37.927 56.035 56.146 59.408
Table 2 Continued
Continued
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1–3, respectively, of table A1 in online supplemental 
appendix A4.
In an attempt to identify which of the instruments are 
invalid (and hence should not be used), we re- estimated 
the specification shown in column 3 of table 2, adding one 
instrument at a time to the set of second- stage controls. 
This process suggests that three instruments (the two MFF 
indices and the London LA dummy) are invalid and re- es-
timation without these yields the result shown in column 
4 of table 2. As expected, the Hansen- Sargan test statistic 
has improved considerably but there is still a weak instru-
ment issue for social service expenditure (the Sanderson- 
Windmeijer F- statistic is only 4.875). The equation used 
to predict social service expenditure is in column 5 of 
table A1 in online supplemental appendix A4 and this 
has three insignificant instruments (the unitary authority 
dummy, the area cost adjustment variable and the sparsity 
measure). If we re- estimate without these instruments, 
we obtain the second- stage result shown in column 5 of 
table 2. The Sanderson- Windmeijer test statistics improve 
but the Pesaran- Taylor reset test statistic suggests that 
there is some mis- specification. The addition of the 
squared value of the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 
resolves reset test issue and generates the result shown in 
column 6.
Finally, the Sanderson- Windmeijer test statistic for the 
instruments for social care expenditure moves above the 
‘rule of thumb’ critical value of 10 if the least significant 
instrument for this variable (the proportion of households 
that are owner occupied households) is deleted from the 
specification. This result is in column 7 of table 2 (the 
corresponding first- stage results are in columns 13–15 of 
table A1 in online supplemental appendix A4).
Forward selection
The use of forward selection to identify relevant control 
variables reveals a similar but slightly different set of 
control variables to those from the backward selection 
process. If this different set of controls is included in 
an IV specification with all potential instruments, then 
we obtain the result shown in column 1 of table 3 (the 
corresponding first- stage results are in columns 1–3 of 
table A2 in online supplemental appendix A4). This 
has three covariates all of which are statistically signifi-
cant with negative coefficients on the three expenditure 
variables. The problem with this specification is that the 
instrument set is not valid, but if we drop the four most 
problematic instruments and re- estimate, we obtain the 
result in column 2 of table 3 (see columns 4–6 of table 
A2 in online supplemental appendix A4 for the first- stage 
results). Although the instruments are still invalid at the 
5% level (Hansen- Sargan test statistic), there has been 
considerable improvement. However, the loss of these 
four instruments has not overcome the weakness issue 
associated with the instruments for healthcare and social 
service expenditure (the Sanderson- Windmeijer F- statis-
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If we drop the two least significant instruments, we get 
the result in column 3 of table 3. The instrument set now 
shows no evidence of invalidity but there is still some 
evidence of weakness. We have no further instruments to 
add but, if we check to see whether any of the currently 
omitted covariates belong in the specification, we find 
that the addition of the measure of ‘older person need 
for social service care’ has a significant positive coefficient 
(result not shown). The inclusion of this variable gener-
ates an insignificant coefficient on the ‘owner occupied’ 
instrument for social service expenditure and, if we re- es-
timate without this, we obtain the result shown in column 
4 of table 3. In this specification, the expenditure vari-
ables are endogenous, the instrument set is valid, and the 
Table 3 Obtaining a joint preferred specification for social care, healthcare and public health expenditure by combining full 
specifications with forward selection (second- stage results) (created by the authors)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All causes All causes All causes All causes
2013/2014 PB/GSS/PH 





SYLLR 2013/2014/2015 SYLLR 2013/2014/2015 SYLLR 2013/2014/2015
SYLLR 
2013/2014/2015









Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
IV second stage IV second stage IV second stage IV second stage
Parsimonious 
specification Specification_2 Specification_3 Specification_4
11 instruments 7 instruments 5 instruments 4 instruments






























































Observations 150 150 150 150
Endogeneity test statistic 10.644 17.686 21.100 23.214
Endogeneity p value 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.000
Hansen- Sargan test statistic 25.690 10.432 2.173 0.080
Hansen- Sargan p value 0.001 0.034 0.337 0.778
Pesaran- Taylor reset statistic 0.052 0.372 0.080 0.001
Pesaran- Taylor p value 0.820 0.542 0.777 0.972
SW_PB F- statistic 5.977 6.833 7.878 13.534
SW_PB p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SW_GSS F- statistic 4.939 5.521 6.135 9.722
SW_GSS p value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
SW_PH F- statistic 18.451 22.092 30.944 46.946
SW_PH p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust SEs in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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instruments for each expenditure variable demonstrate 
no evidence of weakness. There is also no evidence of 
mis- specification.
Application of estimated elasticities to spending constraints
In a recent paper annual data on healthcare and social 
care spending for England from 2001 to 2014 was used 
to estimate the impact of the UK government’s austerity 
programme on mortality.8 Time trend analysis was used 
to compare actual mortality rates in 2011–2014 with the 
counterfactual rates expected based on trends before 
the imposition of austerity. These authors found that 
spending constraints between 2010 and 2014 were asso-
ciated with 45 368 more deaths than would have been 
expected based on pre-2010 trends.
We can use the outcome elasticities reported above to 
present some alternative but comparable estimates and 
these are summarised in table 4. The public health elas-
ticities are not included in the excess deaths calculations 
because time series data for public health expenditure 
are not available before 2013/2014 and this is probably 
why the time trend analysis did not consider the impact 
of public health expenditure.8 We have included this vari-
able in the mortality outcome equations estimated here 
because our study year (2013/2014) is the first year for 
which public health expenditure data are reported and 
its omission may bias the estimated coefficients on the 
other two healthcare- related types of expenditure. More-
over, a recent paper suggests that public health expendi-
ture has a significant effect on mortality.10
The outcome elasticities associated with healthcare and 
social care expenditure are in column 1 (backward selec-
tion) and column 2 (forward selection) of table 4. The 
time trend study reports that real social care spending 
per capita increased by 2.20% between 2001/2002 and 
2009/2010 but decreased by 1.57% between 2010/2011 
and 2014/2015. If this annual difference (3.77%) is 
applied to each of the latter 4 years, then the total 
spending gap is 15.08% (column 3). In 2012, there 
were 467 000 deaths in England. The more conservative 
of the two social care elasticity estimates suggests that a 
1% increase in spend would save 1569 lives (=0.336% of 
467 000). Hence, the ‘loss’ of 15.08% of social care expen-
diture over the period 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 is associ-
ated with 23 662 excess deaths.
A similar calculation can be undertaken for health-
care expenditure. The time trend study reports that 
real healthcare spending per capita increased by 3.82% 
between 2001/2002 and 2009/2010 but by 0.41% 
between 2010/2011 and 2014/2015. If this annual differ-
ence (3.41%) is applied to each of the latter 4 years, then 
the total spending gap attributable to austerity is 13.64%. 
Our healthcare elasticity suggests that a 1% increase in 
spend would save 2484 lives (=0.532% of 467 000). Hence, 
the ‘loss’ of 13.64% of healthcare expenditure over the 
period 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 is associated with 33 888 
excess deaths.
The more conservative of our two sets of results suggest 
that the constraints on the growth of healthcare and 
social care expenditure during this period of ‘austerity’ 
have been associated with 57 550 (=23 662+33 888) more 
deaths than would have been observed had expenditure 
growth followed pre-2010 trends. The less conservative of 
our two sets of results suggests more deaths (see column 
5 of table 4), and both estimates can be compared with 
the results from the time trend study (see column 6 of 
table 4).8
Table 4 Results summary (created by the authors)






Deaths attributable to spending 
gap
(=annual deaths*elasticity*gap) Deaths 
attributable to 
spending gap 














Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Social care 
expenditure
−0.336 −0.471 15.08% 23 662 33 170 n/a




(2183 to 45 071) (−211 to 66 550)
Healthcare 
expenditure
−0.532 −0.693 13.64% 33 888 44 143 n/a




(892 to 66 884) (1720 to 86 567)
Total social care and 
healthcare
n/a n/a n/a 57 550 77 313 45 368
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DISCUSSION
Although our study has adopted an entirely different 
approach to the time trend study, it reveals a broadly 
similar picture: that ‘austerity’-related reductions in the 
growth of healthcare and social care expenditure have 
been associated with a much larger number of deaths 
than would have been expected had pre- austerity expen-
diture trends continued.
Both the healthcare and the social care expenditure 
variables have a significant negative effect on mortality 
in both the backward and the forward selection specifi-
cations, and the public health effect is also statistically 
significant in the latter specification. If we focus on the 
more conservative estimates (from the backward selection 
specification), we note that the coefficient on social care 
expenditure is −0.336. This suggests that a 1% increase 
in expenditure is associated with a 0.336% reduction in 
mortality. The coefficient on healthcare expenditure is 
larger (absolutely) at −0.532 but it should be noted that a 
1% boost in the healthcare budget would cost about four 
times as much as a 1% boost in social care expenditure.
The coefficient on healthcare expenditure, −0.532 
(backward selection) or −0.693 (forward selection), can 
be compared with that reported by a recent study that 
undertook a similar analysis of English data for 2013/2014 
but which excluded social care expenditure from the esti-
mating equation. In that study, the coefficient on health-
care expenditure was −0.672.10 The difference between 
these estimates is relatively small. Several recent studies 
from Australia, England, Spain and Sweden have sought 
to establish how responsive mortality is to changes in 
healthcare expenditure.31–34 These studies have typically 
omitted other types of health- related expenditure but our 
findings suggest that the addition of these other types of 
expenditure will have little impact on the responsiveness 
of mortality to healthcare expenditure.
As social care expenditure is designed primarily to 
improve recipients’ quality of life, it is slightly surprising 
that the coefficient on social care is as large as −0.336, 
particularly when the elasticity associated with health-
care expenditure is −0.532 (both figures are backward 
selection estimates). To understand this relatively large 
mortality response to social care expenditure, we need 
to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of 
healthcare and social care expenditure. Healthcare 
expenditure has a primarily direct effect on mortality; we 
would expect areas with better healthcare provision to 
have lower mortality rates because more expenditure will 
buy more medical staff and facilities, and these inputs are 
directly responsible for life- saving healthcare.
Social care, on the other hand, may generate both direct 
and indirect effects on mortality, and the relative size of 
each effect is unclear. There will be a direct effect via the 
prevention of life- threatening conditions (eg, better social 
care provision might mean that vulnerable people are less 
likely to have life- threatening falls), but there will also be 
an indirect effect where better social care facilitates access 
by others to healthcare services. For example, if a patient 
cannot be discharged from hospital due to a lack of social 
care provision (eg, due to a lack of care in the community 
or residential home beds), his/her hospital bed cannot 
be used by others who might benefit from it. In this way, 
the indirect effect of social care facilitates lower mortality, 
not for those receiving the social care, but for those who 
are able to access healthcare sooner than they would 
otherwise have done.
Study limitations
This study is constrained by the availability of mortality 
data and health- related expenditure data, and the imple-
mentation of central government funding formulae with 
exogenous elements for all three types of expenditure. 
Our study year (2013/2014) is the first year for which 
there were resource allocation formulae for both health-
care and public health expenditure, and an RNF informed 
the allocation of central government funding to LAs for 
social care. As a result, estimation of a panel data spec-
ification is not permitted by the data and the estimated 
elasticities for 2013/2014 may not hold in other years.
The estimated mortality equation contains no dynamics 
and implicitly assumes that all health benefits occur 
contemporaneously with expenditure. However, as our 
health outcome measure reflects mortality in both the 
same year as expenditure and also in the two subsequent 
years, we do capture some of the lagged effect. Never-
theless, we readily acknowledge that some health bene-
fits associated with current expenditure may occur many 
years later. At the same time, however, we also acknowl-
edge that current mortality may reflect health- related 
expenditure from many years ago. Our implicit assump-
tion is that these two effects broadly cancel out each 
other so that, by relating current expenditure to current 
outcomes, we obtain a reasonable estimate of the total 
effect of expenditure on mortality.
We should also note that primary care and specialised 
commissioning are not included in the measure of health-
care expenditure used here. This is because responsibility 
for these types of expenditure returned to central admin-
istrators in April 2013 following the reforms associated 
with the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Therefore, 
if, for example, the centralisation of specialist commis-
sioning led to the unequal provision of such services 
across the country, this could have an unaccounted- for 
effect on the relationship between local spending and 
mortality. Related to this, there is also the possibility that 
we have omitted a relevant confounder (eg, one that 
affects both mortality and expenditure) from our regres-
sion specifications and such an omission may affect the 
size of the mortality response to expenditure.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our results—using an entirely different estimation 
approach—have confirmed the results reported previ-
ously: that the restrictions on the growth in health and 
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associated with tens of thousands more deaths than would 
have been observed had pre- austerity expenditure growth 
been sustained.8
While previous studies have found that healthcare and 
public health expenditure have a significant negative 
effect on mortality, this study makes a major contribution 
by additionally estimating the effect of social care expen-
diture. There is evidence that all three types of health- 
related expenditure have a significant negative effect on 
mortality. There is also evidence that additional social 
care expenditure is more than twice as productive as addi-
tional healthcare expenditure, and that the addition of 
social care expenditure in the health outcome equation 
has little effect on the size of the mortality response to 
changes in healthcare expenditure.
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